Thursday, December 12, 2019

Can Skepticism Be Defended, Perhaps In A Limited F Essay Example For Students

Can Skepticism Be Defended, Perhaps In A Limited F Essay orm?Can Skepticism Be Defended, Perhaps In A Limited Form?1. IntroductionThis essay centres around what it means to know something is true and also whyit is important to distinguish between what you know and do not or can not know. The sceptic in challenging the possibility of knowing anything challenges thebasis on which all epistemology is based. It is from this attack on epistemologythat the defence of scepticism is seen. 2. Strong ScepticismStrong scepticism states that it is not possible to know anything. That is wecannot have absolute knowledge of anything. This can however immediately havethe reflexive argument turned on it and have the question begged of it: If itis not possible to know anything then how is it you know that nothing isknowable ?. Strong Scepticism is therefore unable to be defended. 3. A Definition of KnowledgeKnowledge can be said to be information that the brain has received that meets acertain set of criteria. When someone states that they know something they mustalso believe that, that something is so. If they did not believe in it then howcould they take it in as knowledge ?, they would instead be doubtful of it andlook for evidence or justification as to why they should believe it. Secondly for someone to believe in something they must also believe that it istrue. If they did not believe that it was true then what is mentioned abovewould not occur. So, so far it is decided that knowledge should be true belief. How does one cometo the conclusion that something is true however ?. We seek justification. Thejustification really is the most important part of the criteria because withoutit one cannot say something is true and therefore cannot say that one believes. This does however bring up the question of how does something become justified ?,do we hear it from other people ?, see it on the news ?. The justification ofsomething really depends on its predictability. If something becomes predictablethen it can becomes justified aswell. For example, I know that the sun will risetomorrow is a fair thing to say because I believe this is so, I believe this istrue, and I am justified in believing this due to my past experience* of thepredictableness of the sun rising each day. The only problem with meeting the set of criteria laid out above is that onemust use one senses to do so and as shall be shown in the next section they arenot the most reliable of instruments. 4. PerceptionsA persons sensual perceptions are generally their means of receiving informationbut how much can we trust our senses ?. Two examples of a persons sensualperception leading them astray are as follows. Two people are looking at a white object. The first person is looking at theobject through a transparent red sheet and the other through a transparent greensheet. Neither person knows that the sheets are there so both come away withdifferent conclusions and perceptions as to what colour the object in front ofthem is. (Cornman, Lehrer, Pappas, 1992, pp. 46-47)Another example is when two people are looking at an oblong object fromdifferent angles one may see a perfect rectangle the other a perfect square. (Cornman, Lehrer, Pappas, 1992, pp. 46-47)The point I am making here is that sensual perceptions are all relevant to theposition of the observer. This is not a good situation for something that wecontrive to get justification for our knowledge from. 5. The Brain in the Vat ArgumentThis argument is similar to the one in Platos republic in that it involves animaginary situation where the people or person involved believes that they haveknowledge (Plato, Cave Analogy, Book VII). In the brain in the vat example the brain believes that it is a fullyfunctioning human being and there exists an external world around it. The reasonfor the brain believing that it knows this is that it has reasonable belief dueto the fact that everything in its environment coheres, this is obviously notso however if everything does not cohere (Harrison, 1966-67, pp 179-189). The Emptiness of the American Dream in The Great Gatsby Essay7. Justification of Arguments from ExperienceFrom ones experience or observations, current and past, one can inductivelyinfer what will happen in the near future and where certain things exist. Therefore one can say that in the cupboard my coat is hanging and that I shallhave a sandwich for lunch. David Hume however argued that I cannot know that mycoat is in the cupboard unless I have justification in believing that myexperience makes my proposition probable (Dancy, 1985, p.15). This again drawson my knowledge of the consistency of the outside world but it also needs me tobelieve that events that I have not observed are similar to those I haveobserved and Humes point is that I have no reason to believe this. The sceptical side of this therefore is that one cannot make assumptionsregarding ones senses which are unreliable in the first place. The experiencesone has had cannot lead to assumptions beyond ones experiences. The epistemists response to this would be to then ask the sceptic but wherewould we be if we could not believe the unobserved events to be happening. Thereasonable belief of these events flows from the consistency of the outsideworld. If we could not believe in this consistency sitting down would even causeproblems due to the fact that the chair would at some point become an unobservedexperience. The fact of the matter is that we would not be able to survive forvery long if we could not trust in our previous experience. 8. The Epistemist Rejoin for all ArgumentsThis is the reply that any epistemist can make to a sceptic with a guaranteedoutcome. The epistemist really just needs to say that since the sceptics arguethat there is no knowledge only reasonable belief then reasonable belief is themost they can have of their propositions and conclusions. This is anotherexample of the reflexive argument being turned on scepticism. 9. ConclusionJudging by the above arguments, which are admittedly not of the strongestsceptical type as they are all global arguments and do not attack our notion ofunderstanding, scepticism can be defended. The onus of proof of the fact thatknowledge exists lies with the epistemist and viewing the above arguments. Thesceptic should concede that reasonable belief can exist but should vehementlyargue that true knowledge cannot exist even though reasonable belief orjustification exists. The part of the knowledge criteria that causes the problemis the truth criterion and this criterion can never totally be fulfilled. BibliographyAyer, A. J. (1965), Philosophical Essays, London: MacMillan Co. Ltd. Ayer, A. J. (1980), Hume, London: Oxford University Press. Cornman, Lehrer, Pappas (1992), Philosophical Problems and Arguments AnIntroduction , Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. Coval, S. (1967), Scepticism and the First Person, Great Britain: Methuen Co. Ltd. Dancy, Jonathon (1985), An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, GreatBritain: Basil Blackwell Ltd. Descartes, Rene (as translated by E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross) (1969), ThePhilosophical Works of Decartes vol. I II, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress. Edwards, Paul (1965), The Logic of Moral Discourse, New York: The Free Press. Gorovitz, Williams (1967), Philosophical Analysis, An Introduction to ItsLanguage Techniques, New York: Random House. Guthrie, W. K. C. (1971), The Sophists, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hamlyn, D. W. (1983), The Theory of Knowledge, London: Macmillan Press. Harris, Errol (1969), Fundamentals of Philosophy A Study of Classical Texts,U.S.A.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. Harrison, J. (1966-67). A Philosophers Nightmare or The Ghost not Laid. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol LXVII. Hume, David (1962), A Treatise of Human Nature, Great Britain: Fontana Library. Presley, C. F. (1967), The Identity Theory of Mind, St Lucia: University ofQueensland Press. van Inwagen, P. and Lowe E. (1996) . Why Is There Anything At All?. Proceedingsof the Aristotelian Society, Vol LXX.

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